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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, Mexico has been the site of serious
reform in occupational safety and health law. The impetus for
this change has been threefold: 1) neoliberalism-an emergent
public philosophy favoring shrinkage of state economic control
and authoritarian methods1; 2) globalization--desire to integrate
and harmonize Mexico's economy with that of the U.S. and those
of other "normal" market democracies2; and 3) NAFTA-
pressures stemming from the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and its labor "side agreement," the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), to improve
the quality of labor protections.
This article aims to describe these reforms, raise questions
about their implications, and provide preliminary assessments.
1. Graciela Bensusin Areous, The Mexican Model of Labor Regulation and
Competitive Strategies, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN NORTH
AMERICA, 56, 59, 61 (Maria Lorena Cook & Harry C. Katz eds.) (highlighting trade
liberalization and privatization, possible augmentation of "transparency," "strengthening
of the principle of legality;" and reduced role for "state discretion," in Mexico's
governmental culture); see generally, Graciela Bensusdn, Labor Reform in Mexico for
Union Freedom, Democracy, and Transparency: A Minimum Agenda (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) (linking Mexican labor law reform with neoliberalism).
2. Graciela Bensus~tn Areous, The Mexican Model of Labor Regulation and
Competitive Strategies, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN NORTH
AMERICA, 52-53, 56 (Maria Lorena Cook & Harry C. Katz eds.) (contrasting previous
period emphasizing development "based on the internal market" with current strategy
more oriented to the "foreign market").
3. Id. at 59 (characterizing recent pressure to improve effectiveness of Mexican
labor legislation as originating from U.S. government in context of NAFTA, not from
Mexico's official labor movement; arguing also that NAALC erects a form of "international
supervision" of Mexico's worker protection legislation).
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In general the reforms seem to convert Mexico's occupational
safety and health law system from one less to one more like that
of the U.S. If so, there are two opposed pitfalls for U.S. observers
to guard against in description and evaluation: over-praising and
over-criticizin . Excessive praise may stem from deficient
understanding of Mexico's older and different system and from
self-flattering assumptions that our own system is normative and
operates properly. Excessive criticism may stem from a
romantic, "rose-colored" (pun intended) view of Mexico's older
system because of its official self-conception as a worker-friendly
regime under the aegis of the PRI ("Party of the Institutionalized
Revolution," roughly translated). With these opposed caveats in
view, I nevertheless offer a preliminary assessment, which is
cautiously optimistic. Mexico may be on its way to exchanging a
system of ample but relatively hollow legal promises of workplace
safety and health,4 characterized by overregulation, waste, and
corruption, for one of more modest, realistic, and reliable legal
promises offering better protection with less overregulation,
waste, and corruption. 5 If this be neoliberalism, globalization,
and NAFTA, it may come time to praise them.6 It is important to
stress, however, that both this overall assessment and the more
particular assessments offered below, though plausible, are
highly conjectural.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part II
sets out a static description of Mexico's occupational safety and
health legal structure as it exists on paper today. This includes a
description of workers' compensation under the assumption that
it can be viewed as one component of overall occupational safety
and health policy. Part III focuses on the most significant recent
reform initiatives represented in this current structure and offers
preliminary evaluation. Part IV analyzes and evaluates features
from the pre-reform system retained under the current reformed
system. Part V identifies and discusses features-some old, some
4. Liberty International Risk Services, Health and Safety in the Workplace-
Mexico-Survey and Summary of Findings 3 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) ("In 1992, Mexico was listed in the International Labor Office's Year Book of
Labor Statistics as having the second highest accident rate in the world")[hereinafter
Liberty Int'l.].
5. Areous, supra note 1, at 52, 60 (characterizing Mexico's traditional levels of
protection for workers as "formally higher" than in the U.S. but as plagued by
"inefficacy").
6. But see Id. at 60 (suggesting "it remains to be seen" whether prevailing reform
atmosphere will yield improvements or decline in well-being of Mexican workers).
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new-in the current system about which there is cause for
concern. Part VI concludes.
II. CURRENT (REFORMED) LEGAL STRUCTURE
A. Framework7
In content, Mexico's workplace safety and health law is
entirely federal.8 The Constitution authorizes the Congress to
enact laws,9 establishes law-making procedures," and empowers
the President to issue implementing regulations.'
In enforcement, responsibility is exclusively federal in 21
economic sectors and for employers run by or doing business with
the federal government or doing business in federally-
administered territory. In other sectors, federal enforcement
authorities get assistance from lower-level governments.
12
Mexico has ratified several International Labor Organization
(ILO) conventions pertinent to occupational safety and health.
These may, in effect, be regarded as federal labor law under a
7. In referring to Mexican legal provisions, there is a dilemma between plain
language English on the one hand and names and abbreviations conventionally used in
Mexico on the other. The following text tries to deal with this dilemma in a flexible
fashion. Citations adopt titles and abbreviations conventionally used in Mexico.
Substantive discussion adopts plain language references, for ease in reading. Correlation
between plain language references and conventional Mexican names and abbreviations
can be discerned by moving between main text and footnotes.
8. Stephen F. Befort & Virginia E. Cornett, Beyond the Rhetoric of the NAFTA
Treaty Debate: A Comparative Analysis of Labor and Employment Law in Mexico and the
United States, 17 COMP. LAB. L. J. 269, 281(1996).
9. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS, art. 73 (Mex.).
10. CONST., art. 72 (Mex.); see also GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO: COMPARISON OF JOB
RELATED SAFETY AND SANITATION PROGRAMS IN MEXICO, CANADA, AND THE U.S.,
UPDATED INFORMATION FOR MEXICO 4 (1998) [hereinafter MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION
I]; GOVERNMENT OF MEXICO, WHITE PAPER: COMPARISON OF JOB RELATED SAFETY AND
SANITATION PROGRAMS IN MEXICO, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES, UPDATED
INFORMATION FOR MEXICO 7 (1999) [hereinafter MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION III.
11. CONST. art. 89 (Mex.); see also DR. NtSTOR DE BUEN LOZANO & LIC. CARLOS E.
BUEN UNNA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A PRIMER ON MEXICAN LABOR LAW 4
(1991)[hereinafter DE BUEN LOZANOI.
12. CONST. art. 123-A § XXI (Mex.); see also Michael Joseph McGuinness, The
Landscape of Labor Law Enforcement in North America: An Examination of Mexico's
Labor Regulatory Policy and Practice, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 365, 374 (1998); O.S.H.
REP., U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., A COMPARISON OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH




constitutional provision incorporating "treaties" into supreme
national law."
The Federal Labor Law (LFT), first promulgated in 1931 and
amended since then by the Mexican Congress,14 codifies basic
labor law,'" including requirements for worker compensation and
workplace safety and health."6 It requires employers to ensure
workplace safety and health. 7 It authorizes labor authorities to
issue regulations, to establish tripartite (employer, employee,
and government representatives) advisory commissions, to study
problems and recommend solutions, to facilitate operation of
enterprise joint committees, and to conduct inspections and
ensure compliance.'
The Federal Regulation for Occupational Safety and
Sanitation and the Environment (Safety Regulation),
promulgated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (STPS)
in 1997, supplanted a complex of prior regulations. 9  Its
objectives are modernization and simplification of the regulatory
framework for occupational safety and health, along with better
protection of both employee health and safety and employer
property rights.20 It was issued pursuant to the Program for
Employment, Training and Defense of Labor Rights; 1995-2000
("Programa de Empleo, Capacitacion y Defensa de los Derechos
Laborales: 1995-2000") issued by STPS in 1995 after broad public
consultations on labor policy.' It details employer and employee
13. HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT CANADA, OFFICE OF INTER-AMERICAN
LABOUR COOPERATION, LABOUR BRANCH: REVIEW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION CAN 98-1
(PART Ii), Report issued pursuant to The North American Agreement on Labour Coop., at
13, 16-18. (Conventions ratified by Mexico pertinent to workplace safety and health
include Convention 150 (Labour Administration), Convention 155 (Occupational Safety
and Health), Convention 161 (Occupational Health Services) and Convention 170
(Chemicals)) [hereinafter REVIEW, CAN 98-1].
14. LEY FEDERAL DEL TRA3AJO (Mex.) (as amended through March 1995) (Foreign
Tax Law Publishers, Inc., trans., 1995) [hereinafter L.F.T.]; see also OSHA COMPARISON,
supra note 12, at I-2.
15. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 6.
16. L.F.T., supra note 14, arts. 472-522.
17. Id. arts. 132.XVI, VIII.
18. Id., arts. 511, 541-42; see also MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at
9-10; McGuinness, supra note 12, at 371-372; OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at I-2.
19. "Reglamento Federal de Seguridad, Higiene y Medio Ambiente de Trabajo,"
D.O., 21 de enero de 1997(Mex.) [hereinafter R.F.S.H.M.A.T.]; see also MEXICO SAFETY
INFORMATION 1, supra note 10, at 4-5.
20. Id. at 9.
21. Id.
224 [Vol. 32:2
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duties, sets out various safety and health rules," and enacts
several new or special initiatives: chiefly, reliance on private
firms called "verification units" to investigate compliance and
23facilitate voluntary prevention programs.
Under authority of the Federal Measures and Standards Act
(Standards Act), technical standards on specific matters are
issued as Official Mexican Standards (NOMs).2' A number of
important NOMs pertain to occupational safety and health.25
STPS issued its General Regulation for Inspection and
Penalties for Violations of Labor Legislation (Inspections and
Penalties Regulations) in 1998.26 Like the Safety Regulation, the
Inspections and Penalties Regulation emerged from the 1995
Program for Employment, Training and Defense of Labor Rights:
1995-2000. It supersedes previous rules.27
The Social Security Law (LSS) provides a system of
financial protection, including worker compensation benefits for
many workers, administered by the Mexican Institute of Social
Security (IMSS)." A significantly amended LSS went into effect
in 1997.29
The Federal Fiscal Code, the Federal Law on Administrative
Procedure, and law on constitutional appeals play roles in the
22. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 15 (Rules cover, among other
things: fire prevention; handling of industrial equipment, power tools, and dangerous
materials; personal safety gear; environmental hazards, and prevention programs); see
also McGuinness, supra note 12, at 372-373.
23. R.F.S.H.M.A.T. supra note 19, at Intro.; see also MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION
II, supra note 10, at 10, 14 (Other initiatives include reducing unneeded licensing and
registration requirements; eliminating registration requirements for joint committees in
small businesses; expanding protection for minors and for pregnant and nursing women;
fostering better training with respect to hazardous jobs and substances; detailing rules on
pollutants, toxins, and ergonomics; and launching specified rules for forestry, sawmill,
agriculture and other industries).
24. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 8.
25. Id. at 15-16.
26. Reglamento general para la inspeccion y applicacion de sanciones por violaciones
a la legislacion laboral," D.O., 6 de julio de 1997(Mex.), Introduction [hereinafter
R.G.I.AS.V.L.L.].
27. Id.
28. LEY DEL SEGURO SOCIAL [hereinafter L.S.S.I(Mex.) 1997; see also OSHA
COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 1-20.
29. See Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social(visited July 7. 1998)
<http://www.imss gob.mx/>(citing text of old and new laws) (The previous L.S.S. had been
in effect since 1973).
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penalty and penalty-review process. 3°
Key agencies are STPS, IMSS, and the National Advisory
Commission on Occupational Safety and Health (Advisory
Commission). STPS drafts technical safety and health
standards; performs inspections; sets penalties; promotes
operation of joint committees; maintains hazard statistics;
promotes research; and disseminates information." IMSS
administers the chief worker compensation program and
coordinates with STPS in carrying out prevention programs.
The Advisory Commission conducts studies, proposes prevention
measures, and reviews draft standards." Chaired by the STPS
Secretary, it draws its other membership from IMSS, pertinent
ministries, employer organizations, and trade union
institutions."
Other institutions play secondary roles. The federal courts
hear enforcement appeals and constitutional challenges. 5 The
Ministry of Trade and Industrial Development (Trade Ministry)
assists the Advisory Commission in licensing firms which
accredit verification units to perform inspections.36 The National
Standard-Setting Commission (Standard-Setting Commission)
issues an annual Program covering all regulatory topics, under
which technical safety and health standards are developed.37 The
Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources, and Fisheries
regulates environmental hazards including ones pertinent to
workplace safety and health. The Ministry of Health may
likewise touch on workplace safety and health in its role of
regulating toxic chemicals.38 Conciliation and Arbitration Boards
(CABs), chaired by government officials and composed of
30. See Michael J. McGuinness, The Role of Sanctions and Incentives in Labor
Regulation: Mexico's Administrative Sanctioning Procedure 6 (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors) (quoting Codigo Fiscal art. 207 (1978), Ley Federal de Procedimiento
Administrativo arts. 83, 85 (1992), and Ley de Amparo arts. 114-115).
31. See generally McGuinness, supra note 30.
32. See OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at IV-3; MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION I,
supra note 10, at 7.
33. R.F.S.H.M.A.T., supra note 19, arts. 114, 116; see also L.F.T., supra note 14, art.
512-A.
34. R.F.S.H.M.A.T., supra note 19, at Intro.
35. McGuinness, supra note 30, at 6-7, 8-15.
36. LEY FEDERAL SOBRE METROLOGICA Y NORMALIZACION art. 70-A (1997) (Mex.)
[hereinafter L.F.M.N.].
37. Id., arts. 60, 61-A.
38. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 5; see also McGuinness, supra
note 12, at 375, n.46.
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employer and employee representatives in equal numbers, may
hear workplace disputes, including ones involving health and
safety and worker compensation payments.3 9
B. Standard-Setting
Standard-setting for workplace safety and health comports
with other forms of regulation under the Standards Act.4° The
Standards Act was enacted to enhance transparency, uniformity,
and efficiency in establishing NOMs and to improve compliance.4
It sets up the Standard-Setting Commission to coordinate the
regulatory efforts of federal agencies, including STPS. The
Standards Act aims to promote increased participation by public,
private, scientific, and consumer representatives in standard-
setting and compliance. It also establishes an accreditation
system for testing laboratories, verifications units (private firms
monitoring compliance), and standard-setting organizations
(which issue voluntary-compliance standards called Mexican
norms). 2
The Standard-Setting Commission, with members drawn
from STPS and other regulatory agencies, develops an annual
Program for the establishment, modification, and/or cancellation
of NOMs. Except for emergency rule-making, proposed NOMs
should comport with the Program."
NOMs on workplace safety and health fall into three major
categories: 1) safety standards, addressing accident risks in
processes and facilities; 2) health standards, addressing chronic
or acute risks from factors like noise, light, temperature, poor air
quality, toxins, and carcinogens; and 3) structural standards,
addressing institutions and procedures such as medical care,
joint committees, information management, and hazard
reporting.
4
STPS initiates NOM promulgation with a preliminary
39. CONST. art. 123-A, §§ XX, XXXI (Mex.); see also L.F.T., supra note 14, arts. 509,
600 § IV; DE BUEN LOZANO, supra note 11, at 37; Befort & Cornett, supra note 8, at 296.
40. L.F.M.N., supra note 36, art. 40.
41. Id. art. 2(II)(a), (c); see also MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 8.
42. L.F.M.N., supra note 36, art. 2(II)(b), (d)-(f); see also MEXICO SAFETY
INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 8-9.
43. L.F.M.N., supra note 36, arts. 60, 61-A.
44. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 15.
227
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draft.4" It draws on Mexican research and information and on
international sources such as the International Labor
Organization (ILO), OSHA, the European Community, the
American National Standards Institute, and regulations from
various countries.
4 6
Preliminary drafts are reviewed by experts, pertinent
domestic organizations, and/or by international entities as just
listed.47 Accompanied by regulatory impact statements, they are
then submitted to the Advisory Commission for review.48  The
regulatory impact statement must itemize advantages and
disadvantages of the proposal, must explain alternatives
considered and reasons for their rejection, must draw
comparisons with previous regulations, and must assess
compliance feasibility. Where substantial economic impact is
anticipated, a monetized cost-benefit analysis, a statement of
alternatives, and a comparison of international standards must
be presented. Further expert review may also be ordered."
The Advisory Commission posts approved drafts in the
Official Federal Gazette (Gazette) for public comment. It reviews
comments, including any from STPS, and posts its responses and
reasoning. ° It then posts the final NOM in the Gazette. Each
NOM must be revalidated every five years or else lapse."'
In addition to governing issuance of NOMs, the Standards
Act governs Mexican norms, issued by national standard-setting
organizations. 2 Like NOMs, Mexican norms are promulgated
under uniform procedures.53
45. Id. at 13.
46. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION I, supra note 10, at 8; see also MEXICO SAFETY
INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 13.
47. Id.; see also MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 13; L.F.M.N.,
supra note 36, art. 43.
48. L.F.M.N., supra note 36, arts. 44, 46(I).
49. Id. art. 45.
50. Id. arts. 46(11), 47 (II)-(uI).
51. Id. art. 51; see also MExIco SAFETY INFORMATION I, supra note 10, at 8; MEXICO
SAFETY INFORMATION I, supra note 10, at 13.
52. L.F.M.N., supra note 36, arts. 51-A, 65-66.
53. Id., arts. 66-67.
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C. Compliance
1. Employer Duties
The Constitution establishes a general employer duty to
compensate for work-related death and disability.54  It also
establishes a general duty to protect employees, roughly
equivalent to that of the OSH Act.5 In theory, authorities can
use it to cite safety and health violations where no specific
regulations apply.
Specific duties arise from several laws. A number of duties
are referenced repetitively in more than one law. Because
sorting the various sources of duty does not appear important,
these duties may be summarized together rather than itemized
separately. Hence, the LFT, LSS, RFSHMAT, and Standards Act
require employers to: obey standards; maintain safety and health
programs; maintain compliance and compliance-verification
systems; ensure proper equipment and hazardous substance
controls; facilitate operation of joint committees; cooperate in
studies; provide worker training and information about risks,
especially toxins; post rules; allow labor inspections; provide
information and reports to authorities; and protect pregnant and
lactating women." Safety and health provisions apply to all
employers, though other provisions exempt family enterprises."
2. Employee Duties
Several duties are imposed on employees. They must comply
with standards; assist endangered co-workers; cooperate with
54. CONST. art. 123-A §§ XIV-XV (Mex.); see also OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12,
at 11-2 - 11-3.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. L.S.S., supra note 28, arts. 51, 83; see also L.F.T., supra note 14, art. 132, §§ I,
XV- XXIV, XXVIII; art.504, §§ I- IV; R.F.S.H.M.A.T., supra note 19, at Intro., arts. 17,
130; L.F.M.N., supra note 36, art. 58.
58. L.F.T., supra note 14, art. 352 ("The provisions of this law (except the safety and
health standards) shall not apply to family enterprises"); see also art. 472 ("The provisions
of this Title [Title IX - Occupational Injuries] shall apply to all labor relationships,
including special work, subject to the limitation made in Article 352."); The L.F.T. does
not specifically define "family enterprises."
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joint committees; participate in training; exercise care; use
required protective equipment; undergo medical exams; inform
employers of contagious diseases contracted; and report safety
breaches to their employer. They must not endanger themselves
or others, work while intoxicated or under the influence of drugs
without medical certification and notice to the employer, or carry
weapons unless required by the job.59
Employees have the right to have the joint committee inform
them of the workplace safety and health record, to be present and
speak freely during inspections, to obtain copies of inspection
results, and to participate in legal proceedings."
3. Inspections
The Inspections and Penalties Regulation governs
inspections and penalties regarding workplace safety and health
throughout Mexico, whether enforcement lies with federal
authorities or with state and federal district authorities.6' It has
several aims: to promote regulatory simplicity, transparency, and
clarity; to implement deregulation, reduced paperwork burdens
and limits on inspector discretion; to harmonize inspection and
penalty provisions with each other and with the Federal Law on
Administrative Procedure, the Standards Act, and the Safety
Regulation; to strengthen a new system of private verification,
testing, and certification; and to fortify the government's
advisory role.6" It decreases the frequency of periodic inspections
from a six-month to a one-year interval.' It imposes a one-day
advance notice requirement for inspections and require that this
notice specify what the inspection will address, what legal rules
are implicated, and what documents must be produced.64
59. L.F.T., supra note 14, art. 134-5; see also R.F.S.H.M.A.T., supra note 19, art.
18; MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION I, supra note 10, at 19.
60. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 11-4.
61. R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, arts. 1, 2 §§ II-IV.
62. Id. at Intro.
63. McGuinness, supra note 12, at 382 (Over 47,000 inspections were performed in
1996, up from some 37,000 in 1990. Prolonging the interval should cut the total number of
inspections, unless more employers are subjected to them. As of 1995 and 1996,
inspectors performed upwards of 200 inspections per year.). Id. at 386.
64. R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, at Intro., art. 17; see also McGuinness, supra
note 12, at 396 (As a matter of policy, three-day advance notice is standard, to afford
employers time to gather and arrange pertinent documents); Review CAN 98-1, supra
note 13, at 7 (As a matter of practice, "special" inspections (explained in text below) may
230 [Vol. 32:2
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Employers are given rights to notice on key developments in
the enforcement process: abatement deadlines, reporting
requirements, summonses, procedural rulings, penalty
assessments, acquittals, appeal resolutions, and other orders and
requirements.r5
Workplaces are subject to three regular types of inspection.
Initial inspections occur when a workplace is opened, expanded,
or modified. Periodic inspections, normally on a one-year
periodic basis, may also be scheduled more or less frequently
based on prior record, nature of enterprise, degree of risk,
number of employees, and location. Verification inspections
monitor compliance with previous abatement orders."
Workplaces are also subject to special inspections, which can
be ordered at any time if authorities have knowledge of
violations, accidents, mishaps or imminent dangers, or if they
detect irregularities, falsehood or dishonesty in employer acts,
reports, or documentation.
6 7
Employees, employers, and unions may all report violations
to authorities." Employees may complain individually or
through a union about unsafe work, inaccurate reports, and joint
committee failures to identify hazards or secure abatements.69
Authorities review complaints along with incident reports and
other information to determine whether special inspections are
warranted.0 Criteria include: 1) seriousness of possible hazard;
2) compliance history; and 3) labor-management relations, with
an eye toward non-interference with contract negotiations.1
Priority goes to large and high hazard firms, fatalities, serious
accidents, and special hazard programs.72
be performed unannounced. The author has been unable to determine whether such
unannounced special inspections are legally authorized. As a matter of practice, advance
notice of two to eighteen days may be given for "periodic" and also "verification"
inspections (explained in text below)). Id. at 7-8.
65. R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 6.
66. Id., art. 13; see also McGuinness, supra note 12, at 385.
67. R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 14; see also McGuinness, supra note 12, at
379-80.
68. L.F.T., supra note 14, art. 1003; see also OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at
11-4; MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 21.
69. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 11-4, 11.
70. Id. at 11-4, 5.
71. Id. at 11-5; see also MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 21.
72. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at II-10.
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Inspections and inspection policy are handled by a special
STPS bureau. It trains inspectors, promulgates inspection
criteria and guidelines, monitors compliance, conducts
inspections, sets abatement deadlines, orders closings due to
grievous hazards, keeps inspection reports, and advises and
monitors joint committees." Inspectors must be certified by
examination." Inspectors are expected to review documents
(including accident and illness reports), interview workers, and
inspect work materials."'
Inspectors must abide by specified standards of diligence and
integrity, on pain of penalty." Specifically, they may not have a
financial or personal interest in workplaces they inspect, nor may
they accept gifts or donations from employers or employees."
STPS monitors inspector performance by reviewing reports,
investigating complaints, and scrutinizing practices.
At the outset of any inspection, the inspector must provide
the employer a written inspection order and a phone number to
verify it, along with a statement of employer rights and
obligations.79 Representatives of both employer and employees
should be present."0 Employer records and joint committee
reports will normally be consulted.81 A key employer right is to
comment and provide evidence on facts reported."2 Employee
representatives may also submit comments."3 Inspectors may
secure assistance from experts or from the joint committee. 4 In
addition to performing inspections, authorities can request
information and documentation from employers, employees and
joint committees."
73. REVIEW, CAN. 98-1, supra note 13, at 19; see also McGuinness, supra note 12, at
376-380 (The Bureau is called the General Division of Federal Labor Inspection.). Id.;
R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 7
74. McGuinness, supra note 12, at 382 (Training includes classroom, practice, and
on-the-job components.). Id. at 383-84.
75. Id. at 384, 395-96.
76. R.G..A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 29.
77. Id., arts. 28-29; see also REVIEW, CAN 98-1, supra note 13, at 25; L.F.T., supra
note 14, arts. 547-48.
78. McGuinness, supra note 12, at 385.
79. R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 17.
80. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 22.
81. Id. at 2-3.
82. R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, at Intro., art. 17.
83. Id., art. 22.
84. Id., art. 19.
85. Id., art. 15.
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Following each inspection, inspectors must submit reports.
Inspection reports are generally prepared on a same-day, on-site
basis, so that declarations and signatures from the various
parties may be included.86 Inspectors have several key additional
duties, including: specifying abatement deadlines; monitoring
abatement and compliance orders; suggesting immediate
abatement measures for imminent dangers; proposing complete
or partial workplace closure, where appropriate; promoting
cooperation between employers and workforces; ordering
substance testing; providing notice of inspections and penalties;
and forwarding appropriate reports to the public prosecutor. 7 In
addition to ensuring basic regulatory compliance, inspectors are
responsible to monitor legally-required workplace permits along
with employee ability certificates and joint committee
operations.8 They are charged with providing safety and health
advice. They must honor trade secrets.89
4. Verification Firms
Private verification firms may monitor compliance as a
supplement to official inspections.9" Employers and STPS can
hire verification units to inspect and report on compliance to
enforcement authorities.9' Verification firms operating at STPS's
behest must comply with requirements applicable to government
inspectors. 2 Employers have a right to submit evidence, as they
do with government inspectors. 3
Accreditation lies with special private agencies, themselves
overseen by the Trade Ministry and the Advisory Commission.
Accreditation requirements and procedures are governed under
86. McGuinness, supra note 12, at 399-400, 407-408 (Because preparing a proper
report is time-consuming, there is constraint on time for document review, facilities
inspection, and interviews).
87. R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, arts. 8, 3; see also MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION
II, supra note 10, at 23; REVIEW, CAN 98-1, supra note 13, at 24.
88. R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 9; see also REVIEW CAN 98-1, supra note 13,
at 24.
89. R.G.JAS.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 10.
90. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 18.
91. Id., at 13-14, 18; see also R.F.S.H.M.A.T., supra note 19, at Intro.;
R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 16.
92. L.F.M.N., supra note 36, art. 86.
93. Id., art. 99.
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the Standards Act.94  Verification firms and accreditation
agencies must comply with professional standards imposed by
law or face sanctions, including partial or total suspension of
operations, for noncompliance.95
Verification reports can be used to prove regulatory
compliance, thereby securing exemption from government
inspection. It is projected that this private verification program,
under the additional authority of the Standards Act and the
Safety Regulation, will enhance compliance by adding private
inspection resources to the effort. Private verification does not
displace governmental inspection and enforcement authority.
96
5. Joint Committees
Joint committees provide still a third institutionalized
compliance mechanism, additional to official and verification firm
inspections.97 The LFT requires joint committees, with equal
labor and management representation, in every workplace where
it is "found necessary."98 Joint committees are charged not only
with monitoring compliance and assisting in government
inspections, but also with investigating accident causes,
proposing preventive measures, and preparing reports.99 They
perform follow-up inspections and report on abatement
failures."' Further, they can tailor rules to workplace situations
and needs.' Collective labor agreements may confer extra
duties and decision-making power.1
94. Id., arts. 68-73.
95. Id., arts. 118, 119, 120-A, 122.
96. Id., arts. 85, 96; see also R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 16; MEXICO
SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 13-14, 18.
97. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 18.
98. Id. at 11; see also OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at xi, IV-5 (Joint
committees are actually found mainly in workplaces with more than ten workers, which
represent 20 percent of enterprises, employing 80 percent of workers. In 1992,
approximately 114,000 workplaces had registered committees).
99. L.F.T., supra note 14, art. 509; see also MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra
note 10, at 11, 24; DE BUEN LOZANO, supra note 11, at 21.
100. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 11-7.
101. Id., at 1-19.
102. L.F.T., supra note 14, art. 392; see also Befort & Cornett, supra note 8, at 296.
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6. Penalties
Penalty recommendations are forwarded from inspection
authorities to a special STPS bureau, which set penalties, even
where the inspection authority is non-federal.' The Regulations
for Inspections and Penalties set parameters for penalty
proceedings. Accordingly, summonses must specify charges and
explain how information was analyzed in formulating them."'
Employers have a right of reply to charges-including assertion
of defenses, request for exceptions, and proffering of evidence-
and the right to legal representation.1 ' Rulings must specify
legal authority and reasoning. 6
In contrast with the United States, Mexico rarely imposes
first-violation penalties 5  Penalties normally lie only for
imminent dangers or failure to abate problems previously
highlighted by inspectors or joint committees. 0 Sanctions range
from fines to partial or full closing of a facility. Size of fines
legally turns on gravity of offense, on intentional or repeated
nature of violations, and on company financial capacity.' The
Standards Act authorizes penalties for NOM violations
apparently far heavier than the maximum previously available."'
103. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 17; see also McGuinness,
supra note 12, at 387, n. 124 (The bureau is called the General Division of Legal Affairs);
see generally McGuinness, supra note 30, at 4-5 (In recent years, 85 percent to 90 percent
of penalty recommendations from the STPS federal inspection bureau led to penalty
orders.). Id., at 7, n.19.
104. R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 32.
105. McGuinness, supra note 30, at 4-5; see also R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, arts.
32-33.
106. R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 37.
107. Id. art. 38; see also UAW HEALTH AND SAFETY DEPARTMENT, COMPARISON OF
MEXICAN AND UNITED STATES OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LEGISLATION,
REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT 1, at 9 (1993) [hereinafter UAWJ.
108. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at IV-4; see also MEXICO SAFETY
INFORMATION I, supra note 10.
109. L.F.M.N., supra note 36, art. 115; see also R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art.
38; OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 11-7; L.F.T., supra note 14, art. 512-D;
R.F.S.H.M.A.T., supra note 19, arts. 165-168 (Fines for Safety Regulation violations
range between 15 and 315 times the general daily minimum wage in the locality of the
workplace in question, with magnitude of penalty turning on nature and severity of
violation. Fines may be doubled for employers who flout abatement orders.) No
information is available for this study on whether fines can be magnified by counting
violations separately per employee or per day.
110. L.F.M.N. , supra note 36, art. 112-A, 115; see also McGuinness, supra note 30, at
17 (Fines for Standards Act violations range from 20 times the Federal District (Mexico
City) minimum daily wage up to 20,000 times for severe infractions. Repeated incidence
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The Safety Regulation stipulates that the Standards Act governs
NOM violations. This allows for imposition of the heavier
penalties. Penalties specified in the Safety Regulations
apparently govern Safety Regulation violations that do not offend
any specific NOM. Administrative fines do not preclude criminal
penalties.11 1
Both employers and employees may be fined for violations."2
STPS rarely fines employees, perhaps because fear of fines chills
worker reporting of violations."3 Employers may request modified
penalties or extensions on abatement deadlines. There are three
procedures for challenging citations and penalties. First, there is
"right of review" (Recurso de Revision) within STPS. Employers
have fifteen days after citation to file for review.114 Second, and
most importantly, appeal may be taken within 45 days to
Mexico's lower federal court (Tribunal Fiscal) for reversal (Juicio
de Nulidad)."' Finally, an employer may challenge the
constitutionality of a law applied to him before the federal court
of appeals (Tribunal Colegiado) in a special procedure called
amparo.1 1 6
The sanctions bureau and the lower federal court are crucial
players in setting penalty policy, since the bureau administers
penalties in the shadow of the court's jurisprudence."' Because
the court exercises its most active review on determinations of
employer financial capacity, sanctions bureau policy has been
strongly affected there. The bureau now keys its estimate to the
employer profit-share distributions mandated under Mexican
law."' The bureau uses a table to translate an employer's profit-
share figure into a standardized percentage of the maximum
may be met with penalty doubling.); L.F.M.N., supra note 36, art. 113. (Multiple
infractions at a given time may be penalized cumulatively.). Id. art. 116.
111. R.G.I.A.S.V.L.L., supra note 26, art. 38; see also L.F.M.N., supra note 36, art.
117.
112. UAW, supra note 107, at 10.
113. See OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at H1-6.
114. McGuinness, supra note 30, at 6 (Apparently, few challenges under this rubric
are successful.) (citing Ley Federal de Procedimiento Administrativo arts. 83, 85, (1992);
see also OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 11-7.
115. McGuinness, supra note 30, at 6-7 (Significant numbers of sanction orders are
modified on appeal.) (citing Codigo Fiscal art. 207 (1978).
116. McGuinness, supra note 30, at 7.
117. Id. at 8.
118. Id. at 11.
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legal penalty for a given infraction."9 The resulting fine is then
adjusted by other penalty-assessment factors, chiefly gravity of
offense and special mitigating factors, to arrive at the actual
penalty figure. 2' Gravity of infraction is calibrated to three
severity levels: light, for technical infractions causing no
identifiable harm; serious, for infractions causing identifiable
harm to employees; very serious, for infractions causing harm to
the wider community."' Two authorized penalty factors,
employer intent and recurrence of offense, play little actual role
in assessments because violations are presumed to be non-
intentional and because records seldom lend themselves to proof
of recurrent infractions.'22
D. Alternative Prevention and Voluntary Compliance
In 1.978 IMSS and STPS created a risk reduction program,
augmented in 1985.123 It stressed four initiatives: 1) direct risk
reduction; 2) training improvements; 3) public awareness
campaigns; and 4) coordination among government, labor, and
employer organizations.'24
Small firms receive information kits on potential hazards
and basic prevention."' Middle-size firms receive two-day site
visits from multidisciplinary expert teams to recommend
prevention measures.26  Some 11,000 of these occur annually.
2 7
Large firms are targeted according to hazard levels for
prevention-engineering audits."' STPS facilitates operation of
mandatory safety and health programs in large firms."9 Audits
are used to design tailored programs for participating firms."
119. Id. at 12
120. McGuinness, supra note 30, at 14 (Annual profit-share distributions are
established by the Commission Nacional del Reparto de Utilidades para los Trabajadores
(National Commission on Employee Profit-Sharing).).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at IV-4.
124. Id. at IV-4.
125. Mexico Safety Information II, supra note 10, at 34.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 34-35.
129, Id. at 36.
130. Id.
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Participation is voluntary."' Recent reforms seek to encourage
voluntary compliance. The voluntary compliance initiative
counterposes the sharpened penalties authorized by recent
reforms. Under the voluntary compliance initiative, employers
can request STPS advisory inspections under what is called the
advice and orientation program.132 No penalties will be imposed
pursuant to these advisory inspections aimed at assisting
employers in improving their safety and health management. 3 '
E. Information Systems
Employers must give notice of accidents and work-related
illnesses to STPS, to the pertinent inspection authority, to IMSS,
and to the federal CAB.3 4  STPS, labor inspection authorities,
and the federal CAB collect data from employers on job-related
accidents, injuries, and illnesses."' IMSS analyzes statistics and
uses them to develop prevention strategies for reducing accidents
and illnesses.'36 The Social Security and Services Institute for
Civil Service Personnel (ISSSTE) gathers workplace injury and
illness statistics in connection with providing workers'
compensation and other benefits to government employees.'37
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state-owned oil company,
does likewise in connection with issuing workers' compensation
and medical care to its employees."3
The National Statistics and Geographic Information Service
(INEGI), within the Secretariat of Planning and Budget, creates
statistics from death certificates on causes of occupational
fatalities.3 9 Information is used for experience-rating of workers'
compensation premiums, for targeting compliance inspections,
and for identifying workplaces needing hazard reduction
131. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 36-37.
132. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at IV-4.
133. McGuinness, supra note 30, at 18.
134. L.F.T., supra note 14, art. 504, § V; see also MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II,
supra note 10, at 18, 26.
135. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 111-9; see also MEXICO SAFETY
INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 26, 29.
136. L.S.S., supra note 28, art. 83.
137. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at III-10; see also MEXICO SAFETY
INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 30.
138. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 30.
139. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at III-10.
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assistance."14
The National Advisory Commission evaluates and proposes
rules for records and reporting.' It also studies ways to
harmonize data collection from different record-keeping systems,
comply with the ILO's Labour Statistics Convention, and
incorporate data on workers not covered by any system.'
F. Training
IMSS, STPS, and joint committees offer numerous courses
for workers, joint committees, and specialists.' IMSS and STPS
also offer training for middle management on specific topics and
counsel employers on developing prevention cultures.
STPS runs a forensic medicine department, focused on
industrial medicine. 4 1 Its physician staff intervenes in safety
and health disputes and conducts technical studies in industrial
medicine, rehabilitation, and related fields. STPS also operates a




IMSS offers regional research and education programs, and
certain universities offer programs and degrees.4 7 IMSS employs
medical experts, runs a residency program to train industrial
medicine specialists, and offers courses in occupational medicine
through several universities. Industrial medicine specialists
are certified by the National Academy of Medicine. 149 PEMEX
has its own training system.' State safety and health advisory
commissions offer informational programs."'
140. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION I, supra note 10, at 31.
141. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 111-10, 11; see also MEXICO SAFETY
INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 30-31.
142. Id.
143. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at IV-8 (For example, from 1985 to 1990,
IMSS offered 5000 courses for joint committees, 620 courses for technicians, and 120
courses leading to a diploma for physicians and engineers. Other programs had 250,000
participants.); MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 16, 25.
144. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 35.
145. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at IV-10.
146. Id.; see also MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 38.
147. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at IV-9.
148. Id. at IV-9, 10; see also MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 38.
149. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 38.
150. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at IV-5.
151. Id.; see also L.F.T., supra note 14, arts. 487-503.
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G. Workers' Compensation
The Constitution and LFT establish a general employer duty
to compensate for work-related death and disability.' 2 Workers
injured or made ill by their jobs commonly receive compensation
under the LSS, which provides various benefits for pregnancy
and maternity leave, childcare, illness, accidents, disability, and
death." The LSS, Mexico's chief system of compensating work-
related injuries and illnesses, covers the private sector, plus some
public employers, especially state-owned companies."' In
addition to these general schemes, there are specialized
compensation systems for government and PEMEX workers
administered by the ISSSTE and PEMEX, respectively. 55
The IMSS manages workers' compensation under the LSS
and issues benefits.156 Covered employers register employees
with and pay premiums to IMSS, which delivers indemnity to
injured or ill workers, even those indirectly employed through
intermediaries.157 The premiums that fund benefits vary with job
risk and with number and seriousness of prior accidents and
illnesses.9' They are adjusted to reward good safety and health
performance and to punish poor performance. Firms may move
among fee categories, depending on risk factors. 6'
The 1997 LSS revises premium-setting policy. It places less
emphasis on sector risk classifications, more on a particular
firm's individual performance. In theory, even firms in the
highest risk sectors can be rewarded with premiums reduced to
the level of lowest-risk sectors."1  Increased emphasis on
employer record enhances performance incentives. On the other
hand, it de-emphasizes making whole sectors at divergent risk
152. See, e.g., CONST. art. 123-A § XIV(Mex.).
153. ANNA L. TORRIENTE ET AL., MEXICAN & U.S. LABOR LAW & PRACTICE: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MAQUILAS AND OTHER BUSINESSES 52 (1997).
154. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 111-3.
155. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 111-3, 111-10.
156. Renee L. Camacho, A Comparison of Workers' Compensation in the United States
and Mexico, 26 N.M. L. REV. 133, 135 (1996) (IMSS covers approximately 600,000
workplaces.).
157. CONST. art. 123, §. XXIX (Mex.); see also L.S.S., supra note 28, art. 11;
TORRIENTE, supra note 153, at 82 - 83.
158. Camacho, supra note 156, at 136.
159. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 32.
160. OSHA COMPARISON, supra note 12, at 111-12.
161. MEXICO SAFETY INFORMATION II, supra note 10, at 32.
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levels bear their proportionate "shares" of aggregate
compensation costs.
Employers who default on premiums owed to IMSS are
subject to financial penalties.162 Employers who comply with LSS
obligations have satisfied the LFT's worker compensation
obligations.' If an employer who caused an injury or illness has
defaulted on its LSS obligations, IMSS will nevertheless provide
compensation.' The employer will be relieved of LFT obligations
but subject to additional penalties under the LSS.'6 ' Employers
causing intentional harms must indemnify IMSS for
compensation paid.66
Benefits cover medical expenses and income indemnity for
disability.67 Under the IMSS, claimants receive benefits despite
pre-existing conditions that increase the likelihood of harm.6 '
Eligibility is defeated if the claimant was intoxicated at the time
of the accident, or under the influence of non-prescribed drugs.'
Eligibility is also defeated if the claimant purposely caused the
accident, or it resulted from a fight or suicide attempt.1
70
A CAB may increase an indemnity for inexcusable employer
conduct, like flouting health and safety laws, failing to take steps
against repeat accidents, failing to follow joint committee
prevention recommendations, and failing to address risks
identified by workers.' An employer's liability for registered
workers ends once it pays its fee to IMSS. Disputes over
compensation are then between the employee or survivors and
IMSS. 7' They may be heard before a CAB. 7' Employer
162. L.S.S., supra note 28, art. 304.
163. Id. art. 53.
164. Id. art. 77.
165. Id. art. 78.
166. Id. art. 48.
167. Id. art. 56; see also L.F.T., supra note 14, art. 487; TORRIENTE, supra note 153, at
83.
168. L.S.S., supra note 28, art. 45; see also L.F.T., supra note 14, art. 481; Camacho,
supra note 156, at 139.
169. Camacho, supra note 156, at 139.
170. L.S.S., supra note 28, art. 46.
171. L.F.T., supra note 14, art. 490; see also L.S.S., supra note 28, art. 49; Camacho,
supra note 156, at 147 (If a worker (or survivors in case of death) believes his or her
compensation is not correct under the LFT., then he or she can file a complaint with the
CAB up to two years after the accident.); L.F.T., supra note 14, arts. 519, 871-890;
Camacho, supra note 156, at 147-148 ( If a conciliation meeting does not produce an
agreement, the process continues to a hearing.).
172. L.S.S., supra note 28, art. 53; see also Camacho, supra note 156, at 147.
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grievances with IMSS can be heard before tripartite bodies
created under LSS authority.17 '
III. EVALUATION OF PROMINENT REFORMS
A. Verification Firms
Perhaps the most striking reform is the inauguration of a
system of inspection by private firms. Inspections by private
verification firms can be commissioned by STPS to execute its
enforcement responsibilities by proxy or else by employers to
certify compliance, identify noncompliance, and avoid penalties.
STPS is likely to rely increasingly on this device, meaning that
proportionately fewer inspections will be performed directly by
government.
This new approach may represent a positive development for
compliance. Government inspectors have sometimes been
criticized for incompetence, arrogance, and corruption."'
Moreover, government inspections could be thought too
infrequent to provide adequate enforcement. If it ameliorates
substandard inspection and if the government devotes sufficient
resources to commissioning inspections, the private system could
augment the quality and frequency of state-initiated
enforcement. At the same time, employer-commissioned
inspections could mean the commitment of new resources both
from employers and from inspection firms themselves toward
quality inspection and improved compliance. Although
employers must pay for private inspections, the possibility of
avoiding penalties by doing so creates an incentive to commission
them. This could increase the number of inspections.
In the United States, Congress has considered a comparable
private inspection system.'76 A proposed bill would bar OSHA
from inspecting worksites whose compliance with regulations has
been certified by private inspection. The bill proposes to
supplement OSHA's sparse inspection resources, an objective
congruent with Mexico's reform policy favoring inspection firms.
173. L.S.S., supra note 28, art. 295.
174. Id. arts. 270, 294.
175. McGuinness, supra note 12, at 403-404.
176. S. 765, 15 Cong. (1997)
[Vol. 32:2
2001] MEXICAN SAFETY AND HEALTH REFORM 243
Many in the U.S. business community support the bill. However,
the Department of Labor and labor unions in the United States
both oppose any shift toward private inspection.77  U.S.
enforcement policy is premised on a first-infraction penalty
principle. Opponents of private inspections worry about
weakening this core principle.'78 This is not itself grounds for
criticizing private inspection in Mexico because Mexico has no
comparable first-infraction sanction policy to be undermined.
Whether Mexico should move to a first-instance penalty policy is
explored below. 79 U.S. opponents also note that the proposed bill
provides no means of verifying the credentials of private
inspectors. That defect is at least apparently cured under the
Mexican system by the accreditation requirements and
procedures under the Standards Act."' ° U.S. opponents raise
concerns also about the independence of professionals whose
livelihood depends on gaining repeat business from the
industries they inspect. This concern could be raised for Mexico
as well, despite the apparent safeguards represented by
accreditation and procedural requirements.181
In the United States, an alternative to private firm
inspection exists in the form of federally-funded on-site
compliance consultations. State safety and health agencies, with
funding furnished by OSHA, provide consultations at no cost to
employers who request them.8' Consultations do not constitute
enforcement inspections, nor as a rule can they give rise to
penalty citations. Nevertheless in "appropriate" circumstances
described by OSHA as "extremely rare," consultation reports
have been utilized in penalty proceedings.'83 A recently-enacted
regulation limits use of consultations for enforcement purposes to
situations where an employer 1) makes false representations to
officials during consultation; 2) recreates an identified hazard; or
3) fails, according to an independent OSHA finding, to abate
177. Proposed amendment to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Hearing
on S. 765 before the U.S. Senate, 105' Cong., C.R. S4749-$4750 (1997) (statement of Sen.
Michael B. Enzi, sponsor).
178. S. 765.
179. See infra Part V.B.
180. See supra Part II.C-4 (accreditation procedures previously explained).
181. REVIEW, CAN 98-1, supra note 13, at 39.
182. OSHA Rule Gives Employees More Say in On.Site Safety Compliance
Consultations, 69 U.S.L.W. 2253 (Oct. 31, 2000) (Regulations governing such
consultations appear at 29 C.F.R. §1908.).
183. Id.
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serious hazards identified during consultations."' Though the
value of this U.S. consultation system is open to question, Mexico
might do well to consider some version of it as an alternative or
supplement to its recently-initiated private inspection system.
Though private inspection is opposed as potentially
weakening the American enforcement approach, it could
represent an advance in Mexico. In the context of STPS's
perceived inability to enforce regulations fairly in the past, it
may herald an improvement in Mexico's enforcement capability.
B. Standard-Setting
Recent Mexican reforms attempt to institutionalize U.S.-
style notice-and-comment rulemaking, not only for occupational
safety and health, but in all areas of regulation. Proposed
regulations are subject to review, criticism, and suggested
revision before becoming final. This reform should increase
public accountability and, when viewed against Mexico's long-
noted weaknesses in democratic transparency, accountability,
and pluralistic participation, should be applauded.
Public accountability in the United States is enhanced by
two features absent or partially absent in Mexico: judicial review
and competitive elections for executive branch offices.In the
United States, the judiciary reviews executive branch rules to
ensure conformity with statutory and constitutional
requirements. Judicial review also guards against arbitrary
regulatory policies grounded neither in fact nor in policy. Mexico
lacks judicial review of administrative rulemaking, so its
standards are not independently assessed to ensure rationality,
consistency, and lawfulness. Whether Mexico's courts will
assume or be given authority to perform such review is unknown
as yet. Further, the U.S. presidency is a matter of open elections.
Hence, wayward regulatory policy can in theory be punished by
voters, though it may be doubted whether voters actually pay
much attention. Mexico has taken major strides toward
improved political competition over the past decade and has
recently had a fair and competitive presidential election, but
there is no guarantee of continued progress toward greater
political competition.
184. Id. (These new provisions are published at 65 Fed. Reg. 64, 281 (Oct. 26, 2000.)).
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Along with notice-and-comment, Mexican reforms
institutionalize cost-benefit analysis in rulemaking, again not
just for occupational safety and health but across all sectors.
Regulatory proposals must include a regulatory impact
statement and those with major impact must include monetary
cost-benefit comparisons. These reforms roughly parallel the
requirements of a U.S. Executive Order, requiring agencies to
perform regulatory impact analyses estimating benefits, costs,
and cost-effectiveness of proposed rules expected to have at least
a $100 million impact."5  The U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act decision
bars exclusive OSHA reliance on cost-benefit analysis to set
standards.186  Instead, OSHA relies on feasibility analysis,
making protection of employee health pre-eminent unless doing
so is infeasible. Cost-benefit analysis would often require less
protection of employees than feasibility analysis.
It remains to be seen whether Mexico will make cost-benefit
analysis the decisive regulatory focus. Careful evaluation of
health and safety protections may improve standard setting.
Cost-benefit analysis is one means. On the other hand,
wholesale reliance on cost-benefit analysis may undermine
protection for Mexican workers.
C. Enhanced Penalties
Mexico's reforms establish enhanced, sometimes sharply
enhanced, maximum penalties for occupational safety and health
law violations. These seem to signal a renewed commitment to
deterring violations. Maximum penalties have little deterrent
effect, however, unless violations are detected and penalties
imposed. Further, willingness to undertake voluntary
compliance may be limited when violations are either improperly
cited or ignored, or when penalties do not bear a reasonable
relationship to them. It is too early to determine whether, under
Mexico's reforms, a reasonable likelihood exists that violations
will be found and fairly penalized." 7 If not, increased maximum
penalties will do little to deter health and safety violations.
185. Exec. Order No. 12, 866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993-1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
nt., 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735.
186. American Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981).
187. REVIEW, CAN 98-1, supra note 13, at 38.
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Whatever penalties STPS assesses, CAB panels retain
authority to enhance penalties for grievous breaches of safety
and health standards. We do not know to what extent and under
what circumstances this authority is used. While it may seem
anomalous to allocate some penalty-setting authority to quasi-
judicial dispute resolution bodies separate from the STPS, the
same separation of penalty assessing functions exists between
OSHA and the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission. The differences are that first, OSHRC, in contrast
to CAB panels, specializes in health and safety penalty review
and, second, OSHRC does not include employer or employee
representatives in its official structure or decisionmaking power,
though employers do appear before it as parties contesting
sanctions.
D. Employer Due Process Rights in Inspection and
Penalty Procedures
The reforms strengthen due process protections for
employers subject to inspections and penalties. Key protections
include: advance notice of inspections; requirement of a written
inspection order and notice of employer rights; notice of critical
dates and deadlines in the enforcement process; requirement
that charges be specified and explained; the right to offer
defenses; the right to legal representation; rulings that specify
authority and reasoning, the right to seek penalty modification or
postponed abatement; the rights to review and appeal of adverse
rulings. Due process improvements should be applauded as part
of Mexico's move toward replacing authoritarian habits of
government with rule of law habits.
The U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment protects
employers against unreasonable searches. Inspectors cannot
gain access without either identifying specific evidence of
particular illegality as the objective of the search or else
proceeding in accord with an inspection schedule formulated
without targeting particular workplaces. 8' Mexican employers
are not entitled to bar inspectors without search warrants. On
188. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); see also See v. Seattle 387 U.S.
541 (1967); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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the other hand, as noted above, Mexico requires that employers
receive 24 hour advance notice of inspections. In the United
States, by contrast, it is a crime to provide an employer advance
notice of an inspection. Mexico may view advance notice as a due
process reform, and advance notice may streamline inspections
by allowing employers to prepare documents for review,
rearrange work routines, notify joint committees, and take other
preliminary steps. On the downside, of course, advance notice
may allow an employer to conceal violations.
E. Revised Experience-Rating For Workers'
Compensation Premiums
As noted above, Mexico's major workers' compensation
apparatus is entirely federal and entirely public sector and is
administered out of the social security system. None of these is
true of the U.S. system. 9 Nevertheless both systems involve the
collection of premiums from employers to fund awards and the
two systems have broadly similar compensatory objectives.
Broadly speaking both systems are similar also in setting
premiums on an experience-rated basis to provide employers a
financial incentive for preventing injuries.
However, workers' compensation systems vary among
themselves in the intensity of experience-rating on premiums.
Experience rating assigns premium levels based on
individualized safety records on a firm-to-firm basis. This
competes with another objective in premium-setting policy which
requires more dangerous industries as a class to pay higher
premiums than low-danger industries so that industries causing
more or less than average portions of the overall injury and
compensation burden pay their proper "fair shares" in
contributed premiums. This industry-to-industry "fair share"
approach must be balanced against firm-to-firm experience
rating because the more a system follows one approach the less it
can follow the other. If relatively safer firms in dangerous
industries are rewarded with sharply reduced premiums, they
come to pay less than their "fair share" portion of overall costs.
The opposite is true for the relatively more hazardous firms
189. See generally, C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR. AND PETER S. BARTH, COMPENDIUM ON
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 13-18 (1973) in EMPLOYMENT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS,
Ch. 21 (Steven Willbor et al. eds., 2nd ed. 1993).
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within safer industries. Under sharp experience-rating, they
come to pay for a share of the overall injury compensation burden
higher than the share of that burden they themselves cause.
Mexico's reforms entail revising premium policy toward more
intensive firm-by-firm experience rating (more variation in
premiums according to safety record). Apparently the shift is
intended to be substantial in order to accentuate the financial
safety incentives derived from experience rating.' 90 It is difficult
to predict or assess the effects.
As explained, sharpened experience rating comes at some
cost to industry-wide fair shares in burden-bearing. Moreover,
viewpoints are mixed on how much safety improvement is
actually produced by experience rating. Nevertheless, it is
possible that sharper experience-rating will bring down injury
rates.
IV. PRE-REFORM FEATURES RETAINED IN THE POST-REFORM
SYSTEM
A. Joint Committees
Mexico's reforms retain mandated joint committees in
occupational safety and health. This may be a praiseworthy
policy choice, but a number of questions, all of them difficult to
answer, would warrant attention for an adequate evaluation.
First, it is difficult to gauge to what extent Mexico's joint
committees, mandatory on paper, actually operate.' 9' Second,
there is controversy over how much impact joint committees
truly have in reducing workplace injury and illness, even when
they do operate actively.192 Third, some of the available evidence
190. Liberty Int'l, supra note 4, at 12 (One study shows a large proportion of Mexican
employers aware of the premium-setting process in general. It also shows nearly half of
employers both know their own premium ratings and have experienced rate changes
within the two previous years.).
191. Id. at 11 (One study shows a slight majority of Mexican employers reporting that
their joint committees operate effectively.); but see REVIEW, CAN 98-1, supra note 13.
192. Wayne Lewchuck, et. al., The Effectiveness of Bill 70 and Joint Health and
Safety Committees in Reducing Injuries in the Workplace: The Case of Ontario, 22:3
CANDIAN PUBLIC POLICY-ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES 225 (1996) (citing Boden, L.I., et. al., The
Impact of Health and Safety Committees, 26 JOURNAL OF OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 829
(1984) (no statistically significant correlation between committees and accident rates) and
Cooke, W.N. and F.H. Gautschi, OSHA Plant Safety Programs and Injury Reduction, 20
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shows that joint safety and health committees work best when
employers are voluntarily devoted to them, not when they are
mandated.9 Fourth, there is also reason to believe that joint
committees work best under conditions that may not widely
prevail in Mexico: namely that unions be highly committed to
joint committee success and that employees who bring safety
problems to light be protected against discharge.'94 Fifth, since
Mexican unions may often be insufficiently independent from
employers and insufficiently responsive to workers, it is unclear
how effective joint committees formally incorporating union
representation can be.'9' Sixth, joint committees involve costs in
terms of operating expenses and perhaps lost productivity if
operation and participation in them are meaningful, which must
be weighed against the extent to which they succeed in bringing
injury rates down.9 Seventh, how other recent Mexican reforms
may affect the operation of joint committees is uncertain.
Eighth, it is unclear also how larger forces like neoliberalism,
globalization, and NAFTA may affect joint committees
operations."'
It is unwise to assume uncritically that mandatory joint
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 245 (1980)); see also Gregory R. Wachtman, Safe and Sound: The
Case for Safety and Health Committees Under OSHA and the NLRA, 4 CORNELL J. LAW &
PUB. POLICY 65, 85-87 (1994) (Wachtman recounts evidence, ranging from impressionistic
to somewhat rigorous, that joint committees reduce workplace injury.) (citing Paul K
Forder & Robert D. McMurdo, WORKPLACE HEALTH & SAFETY AGENCY WORKING TOGETHER
ON HEALTH AND SAFETY: THE IMPACT OF JOINT HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMITTEES ON
HEALTH AND SAFETY TRENDS IN ONTARIO, CANADA at iii, 27, 29); see also David Weil, The
Impact of Safety and Health Committee Mandates on OSHA Enforcement: Lessons from
Oregon, Economic Policy Institute, Working Paper 112, at 35, 37 (1994) (on file with
author) (inconclusive) [hereinafter Weil].
193. Wayne Lewchuck, supra note 192, at 226 (concluding that joint committees
succeed in reducing accident rates when employers sympathize with committees, but fail
to reduce accident rates when employers are unsympathetic).
194. Id. (concluding that joint committees fail to bring down accident rates when
unions are not sympathetic to their operation); see also Weil, supra note 192, at 27.
195. Although union involvement might elsewhere be a plus factor in joint committee
effectiveness, this context may not apply with respect to Mexico's official union structures.
See generally, Reilly, Barry et. al., Unions, Safety Committees and Workplace Injuries,
33:2 BRITISH J. OF INDUS. REL 275 (1975) (finding that joint committees are most effective
when employee members are appointed by unions, somewhat effective when not
appointed by unions).
196. Wachtman, supra note 192, at 91.
197. Liberty Int'l, supra note 4, at 5 (Although one survey shows a slight majority of
Mexican employers report that NAFTA has had no impact on their safety programs, a
substantial minority might be reporting some effect. Increased competition stemming
from neoliberalism and globalization could induce Mexican employers to enhance
productivity and reduce compensation costs by improving safety.). Id. at 5, 7.
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committees represent sound workplace safety and health policy.
On balance, however, retention of mandatory joint committees
under Mexican law may be wise for several reasons. First,
Mexico's mandatory committee system already exists and could
be crucial where other compliance mechanisms are too weak and
may remain so in the foreseeable future. Second, the legal
mandate may remove competitive advantages some firms could
gain in the absence of a mandate by avoiding both the operating
expenses of a joint committee and the costs of abating hazards
potentially identifiable by it. Third, the legal mandate may
induce employers whose commitment would otherwise be
marginal to establish more effective committees. Fourth,
committees may serve to enhance transparency and pluralist
participation in both decision-making and implementation on
workplace safety and health.'98 Fifth, joint committees may
facilitate reporting of hazards to enforcement authorities.'
Though no national mandate for joint committees exists in
the United States, several states have adopted such mandates. °0
Research indicates that mandated committees enhance union
influence in safety and health policy.20 ' This may be desirable
from the standpoint of circulating and testing ideas, even if no
clear link to reduced injury and illness rates can be proved. But
since Mexican unions often may not represent an independent
workplace voice, it is unclear how effective joint committees can
be and whether enhanced union participation represents a gain.
On the other hand, joint committees might themselves promote
employee involvement-something Mexican unions have been
criticized as lacking.
198. Wachtman, supra note 192, at 82 & n.91 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NO. OTA-H-56, PREVENTING INJURY AND ILLNESS IN THE
WORKPLACE 22 (1985) (referring to avenues for "sharing and conveying information about
hazards and controls") and U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-90-66BR,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH IN THE WORKPLACE 49 (referring to "opening lines of
communications")).
199. Wachtman, supra note 192, at 84-85.
200. Id. at 91 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §95-252 (1993); MNN. STAT. ANN. §176.231
(West 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. 350-6-501 (a)(Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. §48-443
(Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE §23-2B-2 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §39-71-1504 to 1505
(Supp. 1993); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §618.382(2)(b)(Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. LAB. CODE
§6401. 7(a)(5)(West Supp. 1994).
201. Weil, supra note 192, at 36.
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B. Alternative Prevention and Voluntary Compliance
Beyond the new initiative on private inspection firms,
Mexico retains its other mechanisms for alternative prevention
and voluntary compliance. Though some voices have urged
greater U.S. reliance on it, voluntary compliance may have
serious shortcomings. It may require more resources to secure
safety and health gains than does a penalty-centered system and
may actually interfere with proper operation of penalty-centered
systems by diverting resources and by overemphasing
consultation at the expense of sanctions.
Though it may be sensible for Mexico to maintain its
commitment to alternative prevention and voluntary compliance
and to embrace the verification firm system, it is possible that
this may divert resources and priority away from imposing the
heavier penalties authorized under Mexico's reforms. It is also
possible that overemphasizing alternative prevention and
voluntary compliance may prevent Mexico from reconsidering its
policy against first-infraction penalties. The hard questions
concern how much relative emphasis should be given to
alternative/voluntary compliance and to penalty-centered
compliance and how the two approaches can best be combined.
C. CAB Penalty Enhancement
Under the post-reform system, CAB panels continue to have
authority to order enhanced penalties of grievous safety and
health breaches. There may be anomaly in allocating some of the
penalty-setting authority to these quasi-judicial dispute
resolution bodies, separate from STPS. It is difficult to ascertain
how and how often this authority is used and what procedures
and standards govern. It is also difficult to ascertain whether
and how enhanced penalties ordered by a CAB panel may be
reviewed within STPS or in the courts.
For several reasons it is hard to evaluate whether CAB
penalty-enhancement authority is beneficial, harmful, or neutral.
There may be advantages from standpoints of policy, equity, and
due process in lodging penalty-enhancement authority in a
tripartite body. On the other hand, there may be grounds to
doubt that CAB panels actually represent the tripartite
pluralism they officially embody. The CAB system has been
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described by some critics as essentially a puppet of Mexico's
authoritarian PRI party-state system-with governments,
business, and union members all sharing a unified and
entrenched attitude of indifference to actual worker concerns.
Criticism has commonly been directed at established Mexican
unions for being undemocratic, monopolistic, non-responsive to
worker concerns, and subservient to state power and employer
interests."2 The overall accuracy of that jaundiced picture is an
elusive matter. Even if CAB's actually do function more as
vehicles of state policy than as sites of pluralist evaluation,
however, this may not be necessarily negative if the emerging
state policy is stronger enforcement of sound occupational safety
and health standards. One reform worth considering would be
that "union" representation in the tripartite arrangement,
traditionally dominated by party-state unions, be dropped and
replaced by "employee-interest" representation less tied to
allegedly compromised party-state unions.
D. The Role (?) of Tort Law
Nothing in Mexico's reforms directly implicates the role of
tort law in regulating workplace safety and health and
compensating victims of unsafe employer practices. It is
worthwhile to raise questions about the possible role of tort law,
though meaningful commentary is greatly hampered by the
paucity of literature and other systematic information on
Mexican tort law in general and its particular role in workplace
accidents. It is difficult to ascertain what role Mexican tort law,
practices, and institutions play in regulating and compensating
for workplace injury. Mexican tort law does not appear to
provide damages for pain and suffering, such that tort law would
be substantially more advantageous to claimants than would
workers' compensation providing no such damages."3 A further
202. Lance Compa, The First NAFTA Labor Cases: A New International Labor Rights
Regime Takes Shape; 3 U.S.-MExico LAW JOURNAL 159, 174-176 nn.113-127 (1995) (citing
U.S. NAO, Public Report of Review, Oct. 12, 1994, at 28-30; U.S. NAO, submission No.
940003 Follow-up Report, Dec. 4, 1996; see also Lance Compa, Summary of NAALC Cases
1994-Present (unpublished manuscript on file with author); Areous, supra note 1, at 54-
57, 61 (characterizing Mexican union structures as "monopolistic," state-dominated, and
non-representative).
203. Mexican Civil and Comm. Codes art. 1915 (Abraham Eckstein and Enrique
Zepeda, transl., 1995) (In its general provision on tort damages, Mexico's Civil Code
provides that damages "shall be determined by the provisions of the Federal Labor Law."
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uncertainty is the extent to which workplace tort recovery may
be preempted by Mexico's systems of workers' compensation.
Generally speaking, U.S. workers' compensation provisions
preempt tort suits by injured workers and their families against
employers of workers injured or killed on the job. Such tort suits
are disallowed because workers' compensation is the exclusive
remedy. The wisdom of this exclusivity/preemption policy law is
open to debate.
Neither Mexico federal labor law mandating workplace
injury compensation nor the social security law implementing
that mandate in detail for the sectors it covers contains the kind
of explicit "exclusive remedy" provision found in U.S. workers'
compensation statutes. Nevertheless, it may be that Mexico's
worker's compensation systems are by implication treated as the
exclusive remedy for workplace injury, thereby blocking chances
for bringing tort suits, just as with explicit preemption under
U.S. law. The question of tort preemption may not matter a
great deal because tort recovery in Mexico does not provide
itemized enhanced damages for pain and suffering. Because
damages under tort law appear substantially similar to those
under workers' compensation, tort law offers little potential
advantage to claimants as compared with workers' compensation.
On a related point, Mexico's social security law sets out no
provision excluding compensation for injuries intentionally
inflicted by employers. Such an exclusion is typical for U.S.
workers' compensation statutes.2 0 4 Though it may seem strange
to leave victims of intentional harm uncompensated this way,
non-coverage under workers' compensation means that
exclusivity and preemption do not apply. Hence, U.S. victims of
intentional injury may file tort suits in efforts to recover pain and
suffering (and perhaps punitive) damages from employers, over
and above any damages for medical care and lost income. If
It formulates the lost-income indemnity as four times the "highest minimum daily wage
in the region." Id. With specific reference to tort recovery for workplace injury, the Code
provides that employers shall pay "the corresponding indemnity." Id., art. 1935. The
Code can be taken as representative of Mexican law. It applies formally within the
Federal District (Mexico City), which comprises a substantial portion of Mexico's
population, applies throughout Mexico on matters where the federal government asserts
exclusive jurisdiction, and serves as a model for civil codes in the several Mexican states.).
Id. at V; see also The Mexican Civil Code, at xix, (Michael Wallace Gordon, trans., 1980).
204. Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 501 A. 2d 505, 514-515 (N.J. 1985)
(citing N.J.S.A. 34: 15-8).
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Mexican tort law is meaningful in the workplace context (a
matter of doubt, as noted above) and if Mexican workers'
compensation systems by implication or effectively preempt any
such role for tort law, such preemption of tort law remedies
would seem to cover even harms intentionally-inflicted by
employers because such harms are not explicitly excluded from
Mexico's workers' compensation. Mexico's main workers'
compensation system apparently covers "intentional" harms, not
just "accidental" harms since the relevant provisions make no
distinction. Hence, in contrast with U.S. coverage, Mexican
workers' compensation ameliorates whatever hardship may lie in
affording no tort remedies for intentional injury.
Mexico's system could be criticized on grounds that
intentional injuries should be handled through a U.S.-style tort
system not through workers' compensation. Arguably, the
enhanced damages recoverable in a tort system-and the fact
that these damages fall directly against the employer rather than
against a workers' compensation fund-provide augmented
deterrence against intentionally-inflicted injuries, deterrence
that is lost if intentional injuries are simply covered by workers'
compensation.
On the other hand, there are problems in the U.S. system of
covering intentional injuries under tort rather than workers'
compensation. Excluding intentional injuries from workers'
compensation makes victims take their chances on tort recovery.
It also gives rise to extensive litigation over whether particular
injuries were "intentional" or not. This litigation compromises
the basic workers' compensation goal of delivering relief to
injured employees in the most low-cost feasible fashion. The
game may not be worth the candle. Most U.S. states allow tort
suits to go forward, escaping workers' compensation coverage and
exclusivity, only if there was deliberate intent to injure.0 5
Although this kind of deliberate employer-inflicted injury is
appalling, it is also rare. Maintaining tort law deterrence
against it may not justify the social costs of litigating the issue.
True, the deterrence rationale takes on enhanced relevance
205. Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 501 A. 2d at 514-515; see also 6
ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K. LARSON, RLASON'S WORKER'S COMPENSATION, §103 (2000);
Joseph H. King, The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers' Compensation Remedy
Against its Employer, 55 TENN. L. REV. 405 (1988).
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in the minority of U.S. states where "intentional" injury is
construed broadly to cover injuries where the employer knew of a
serious hazard and failed to abate it, thereby deliberately
endangering life and limb though not deliberately inflicting
injury."°6 This kind of deliberate endangerment is far more
common than outright deliberate injury and might seem to
warrant tort action in the name of deterrence. The problem,
though, is that deliberate endangerment often becomes difficult
to distinguish from routine employer negligence. As more
negligence becomes actionable in tort rather than covered by
workers' compensation, the basic goal of delivering relief for
workplace injury on a routine, low-cost basis gets increasingly
compromised. If substituting workers' compensation for tort is a
wise policy to start with, this compromising effect is troubling.
In sum, under either the deliberate intent or the deliberate
endangerment interpretation, the U.S.- style intentional tort
exception from workers' compensation coverage may not be wise
policy. It might therefore be unwise for Mexico to adopt it in
place of its current policy of covering international injuries under
workers' compensation. This position is fortified by a further
consideration. As indicated above, Mexican employers who cause
intentional injury must indemnify IMSS for compensation it pays
out to victims. This approach seems to harmonize the objective
of maximizing deterrence against gross employer misconduct
with the objective of guaranteeing financial support to injured
workers.
V. RESERVATIONS AND CONCERNS
This part raises reservations and concerns about Mexico's
post-reform system, from the standpoint of sound workplace
safety and health policy. By and large, features examined here
are carried over from the pre-reform system. On each point
mentioned, new reforms should be considered.
A. "Whistleblower" Protection
Mexico does not appear to have any legal system for
protecting employees who "blow the whistle" on workplace
206. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 398 N.W.2d 882 (Mich. 1986).
255
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
dangers from retaliation by their employers. A sound system for
promoting workplace safety and heath should include legal
protection for those who report hazards either to inspectors or to
other parties who may hasten abatement of hazards. Employees
with on-the-spot knowledge are often better placed than anyone
else to identify hazards. Active employee involvement can
therefore augment hazard reporting at nominal cost. In a
developing economy like Mexico's these advantages and
efficiencies may be especially key. Hence, well-conceived legal
protection for whistleblowers may be the most important reform
Mexico could consider by way of improving its workplace safety
and health system. At minimum, those who reliably report
serious hazards should be protected against retaliatory
discharge.
Some workers may be protected by collective bargaining
agreements from dismissal without good business reason and
whistleblowers may sometimes be able to report to joint
committees while maintaining anonymity. Still, whistleblower
protection probably needs strengthening. A variety of issues
would need attention. What sanctions should apply against
employers who impermissibly punish whistleblowers? Should
enforcement of whistleblower protection lie in the hands of public
officials, unions, individual complainants, or some combination?
What level of severity in hazard and accuracy in reporting should
be required to qualify for whistleblower protection? Should
protection apply only for reports to public officials? To media?
To in-house parties like superiors or joint committees?
The United States is no model for whistleblower protection.
U.S. whistleblowers essentially depend on self-initiated legal
action under state statutes and court decisions which vary widely
from state to state, °7 and on enforcement proceedings by the
Secretary of Labor,0 ' which are criticized as rare and
ineffective. 20'But because Mexico may need whistleblower
protection even more than the United States, it should consider
instituting it formally.
207. See generally, Robert G. Vaughn, State Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of
Whistleblower Protection, 51:2 ADMIN. L. REV. 581 (1999)
208. 29 U.S.C. 660 (c) (1), §11 (c) (1).
209. Vaughn, supra note 207; see also Safer Workplaces Act of 1999; A bill to amend
the Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970; "Safety & Health Whistleblower Protection
Act," Hearing on S. 653 before the U.S. Senate, 106' Cong., C.R. S2856 - S2857 (1999)
(statement of Sen. Paul D. Wellstone).
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B. First-Infraction Penalties
Mexico's post-reform system appears to preserve the pre-
reform policy against first-infraction penalties. This policy may
unwisely encourage a relaxed attitude toward compliance.
Compliance expenditures can be postponed without sanction
until infractions come to the repeated attention of authorities.
Mexico should consider replacing this current policy with one of
regularized first-infraction penalties, at least for serious hazards.
Post-reform due process protections for employers may be ample
enough to keep such a first-infraction penalty policy from
becoming unduly arbitrary or intrusive.
There would be no strong contradiction between a first-
infraction penalty policy and Mexico's old and new initiatives on
voluntary compliance. Indeed, a first-infraction penalty regime
imparts compliance incentives in the absence of which voluntary
compliance programs may lack adequate levels of commitment,
substance, and effectiveness.21
It could be that a first-infraction penalty policy would
impede Mexico's new initiative on employer-commissioned
inspections. One objective of voluntary inspection is encouraging
employers to enlist experts in identifying hazards. Employers
might hesitate to commission inspections that would result in
penalties. This would compromise the objective of better
identifying hazards. One response to this would be to apply first-
infraction penalties only with involuntary inspections, not with
voluntary ones. Or there could be lighter penalties when the
inspection is voluntary. Voluntary inspection incentives would
be sharpened if first-infraction penalties were more likely or
more harsh from involuntary inspections than from voluntary
ones.
Yet there is a potential disadvantage: that employers might
use the penalty differential between voluntary and involuntary
inspections to game the system. They could commission
voluntary inspections in hopes of getting compliance certification
while avoiding any immediate prospect of penalty. They could
then use inspection firm reports as a chart toward safe harbor
210. Brett R. Gordon, Employee Involvement in The Enforcement of the Occupational
Safety and Health Laws of Canada and the United States, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 527, 552-
553 (1994).
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from penalties at minimum cost. Though this scenario has a
certain efficiency logic in promoting compliance, it may also
divert resources potentially available for health and safety
improvements into a compliance game. Such a system is perhaps
well-designed against overspending on safety and health due to
regulatory uncertainty, but may subtly encourage diversion of
resources and reduced allocations for actual improvements. The
acceptability of this trade-off turns on whether most employers
are able to understand their regulatory obligations without
informational assistance from inspection firms.
C. Under-Staffing on Inspection
The United States is widely suspected of devoting
inadequate resources to workplace safety and health inspection,
despite its considerable wealth.21' Mexico may be as bad or
worse.
Inadequate inspection may be especially troublesome in a
system lacking routine first-infraction penalties. First-infraction
penalties, by imparting a meaningful fear of financial loss, may
partly compensate for infrequency of inspection. If, as one source
contends, STPS inspectors execute 200 inspections per year, the
pace is nearly one per working day. Even for small enterprises,
such a pace is speedy. Large enterprises would seem to require
much more attention. Hence, many inspections in Mexico may be
cursory and inadequate.212 No doubt, Mexico faces tough choices
in resource allocation. Competing economic and policy objectives
might be undermined by increased expenditures on workplace
safety and health. Nevertheless, Mexico's current commitment
to inspections may be far below what is needed for substantial
progress in workplace safety and health."3
D. Workers' Compensation Ineligibility Based on
Claimant Misconduct
As pointed out above, the IMSS denies compensation to
211. S. 765; see also S. 575, 103d Cong. (1993) (proposed by Sen. Edward Kennedy).
212. REVIEW, CAN 98-1, supra note 13, at 39 (One study questions the efficacy of
inspections where employers have received advanced notice.).
213. Liberty Int'l, supra note 4, at 3 (Mexico has been listed with the second highest
workplace accident rate in the world.).
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workers whose injuries arise along with their own misconduct in
certain forms: intoxication, drug use, fighting, attempted suicide
or self-inflicted injury. Somewhat comparable coverage
exclusions may be found under some U.S. workers' compensation
statutes." The wisdom of these coverage exclusions is doubtful,
especially where the injuries involved are substantial.
Two rationales might be offered for such exclusions. One is
that compensation may encourage unacceptable conduct, while
another is that compensating those engaged in unacceptable
conduct is morally offensive. These rationales are weak.
Few workers will be persuaded to suicide or serious self-
mutilation by the lure of workers' compensation payments and
few who are inclined to suicide or self-mutilation will talk
themselves out of it for fear they or their families will go
uncompensated. Hence, there is little real merit in the
incentives/deterrence rationale for coverage exclusion. And
though it may seem morally offensive to "reward" unacceptable
conduct, self-mutilating or suicidal people must be regarded as
deeply troubled. They therefore should not be excluded from the
social care embodied in workers' compensation payments. Were
coverage extended to them, the number of "offensive" awards
would surely be small. Moreover, if coverage is excluded,
inaccurate and unjustified benefit denials may occur where self-
mutilation or suicide are falsely suspected.
Much the same considerations can be applied to exclusions
based on drug and alcohol use. Though such exclusions might be
defended as a device for curbing substance abuse, it is doubtful
that abuse levels would rise if workers knew compensation would
accompany abuse-related injuries: to get the money, the
substance abuser would have to experience workplace injury. If
compensation does not raise the level of substance abuse, denial
of compensation cannot reduce it. Moreover, there are few, if
any, workplace injuries where it is possible to say that drug or
alcohol use was the only cause. For injury to occur, there must
also be a workplace hazard. And if there is workplace hazard,
214. See generally, Workers' Compensation: Effect of Allegation That Injury Was
Caused By Or Occurred During Course of, Workers' Illegal Conduct, 73 ALR 4th 270; see
also "Culpable negligence" or negligence other than "willful' or "serious and willful
misconduct" within provision of Workmen's Compensation Act precluding compensation,
149 ALR 1004; Neglect or Improper self-treatment as affecting right to or amount of
compensation, 54 ALR 637.
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blaming the injury on drug or alcohol use is confused, because
the harm might just as easily have befallen someone who was
sober. Hence, the drug-and-alcohol-use exclusion may in reality
be no more than an arbitrary form of cost-cutting. Combined
with experience-rating on premiums, it may create incentives
toward inadequate precaution by employers. True, the exclusion
also provides what could be considered proper "punishment" for
substance-abusers. But it is questionable whether that punitive
objective properly belongs within workers' compensation policy.
All these objections carry less force when it comes to
excluding coverage for those injured while fighting. Unlike
substance abuse, which merely heightens the likelihood that
workplace hazards will produce injury, fighting creates its own
separate form of workplace risk. If compensation is denied for its
harmful fruits, workers may avoid it. Hence, the incentive and
deterrence rationales for coverage exclusion may actually make
sense. Elsewhere, they are weak, as noted above. It is especially
regrettable if Mexico's retention of such exclusions is inspired by
comparable exclusions under U.S. laws.
E. Protection For Pregnant and Lactating Women
Both pre-reform and post-reform Mexican law mandates
workplace protection for pregnant and lactating women. These
mandates undoubtedly stem in part from concern for the well-
being of fetuses and newborns, not just women workers
themselves. These are valid concerns of course. But overbroad
protection could yield a serious unintended consequence:
curtailed work opportunities for women.
Special protection expenses for pregnant and lactating
women or penalties for violating mandated protections could
raise the costs of employing women or utilizing them in certain
posts. This could drive employers to keep women away from
employment opportunities with pertinent hazards, rather than
incur the expenses and penalties that may go with offering such
opportunities to women. This effect may touch women in
general, not just pregnant and lactating ones, since employers
cannot easily know which women may get pregnant or give birth.
Such employer responses are cause for concern even in the
United States where they might be penalized as illegal sex
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discrimination, because not all illegal discrimination can be
detected and punished. There is even stronger cause to worry for
Mexico, where remedies for employment discrimination are not
developed. The U.S. Supreme Court has placed legal restraints
on employer-initiated "fetal protection" policies. 1 ' Mexico, by in
effect mandating fetal protection policies, lies at the opposite pole
from the United States, which restricts them. Mexico's fetal
protection mandates should be assessed carefully in light of their
possible effects on equal employment opportunities for women.
F. Right to Refuse Dangerous Work
Mexican law provides employees no explicit right to refuse
dangerous work. Such a right might encourage employees to
avoid unsafe work circumstances without fear of job loss or
sanction and might also promote identification and reporting of
job hazards. The apparent absence of such a right could be
considered a weakness in Mexico's workplace safety and health
law.
U.S. law provides rights to refuse dangerous work, though
this U.S. protection has been criticized as too weak to be
effectual.216
Mexico should consider prohibiting discrimination against
employees who refuse dangerous work, at least where there is an
objectively reasonable fear of death or serious injury. Review by
neutral safety officials could be utilized to determine whether
conditions justified the work refusal under such a standard and,
in absence of requisite danger, authoritatively order resumption
of work under pains of employer sanction for those who continue
to refuse. A system not unlike this currently prevails in Canada
215. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 111 S.Ct. 1196 (1991).
216. 29 CFR 1977.12 (A regulation under §11(c) of the OSH Act, which prohibits
discrimination against employees who exercise rights conferred under the Act, provides
that refusing work under a reasonable fear of death or serious injury is a right conferred
under the Act.); see also Whirlpool Co. v. Marshall, 450 U.S. 1 (1980). (Though employees
who refuse dangerous work as defined in the regulation are protected from employer
discrimination, this protection may not include a right to receive wages for the lost work
time. The risk of lost wages under this protective scheme may chill employees in
exercising their purported right.); 29 U.S.C. 143(a) (Under the National Labor Relations
Act, employees who refuse to perform work where there is objective evidence of an
abnormally dangerous condition may not be ordered back to work by a court in
enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement no-strike clause); Gateway Coal Co. v.
United Mineworkers of America, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
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and would probably not create an undue problem of
malingering.217
G. Compensation for Work-Related Illness
Although Mexican law authorizes workers' compensation
awards for work-related disease, 18 one recent study raises
questions whether proper awards actually get made in cases of
long-term illnesses like asbestosis that may be caused by
workplace exposures but not detected for years afterward. 19
Issues include: determining whether and to what extent a
particular claimant's injury was caused by workplace exposure as
opposed to other exposures, genetic proclivity, life habits, or other
causes; ensuring that potential claimants know they may have
grounds to seek awards; and calculating premiums so as to cover
workplace-caused damage not manifesting itself until long after
the pertinent activities and exposures took place. ' Mexico's
record may not be uniquely bad. The problems raised by work-
related illness are perplexing ones that also bedevil workers'
compensation systems in the United States and elsewhere. It is
for that reason that they should get priority attention.
H. Specific Weakness Dealing with Problems Raised by
Hazardous Substances
A NAFTA-Commissioned study raises specific concerns
about inadequacies in workplaces utilizing hazardous materials,
concerns about employee information, labeling (including
Spanish language), and personal protective equipment.
21
Improved performance on these matters should be deemed a
priority.
217. See generally Gordon, supra note 210.
218. LFT, supra note 14, art. 473.
219. REVIEW, CAN 98-1, supra note 13, at v, 40.
220. See generally, Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Compensation and
the Persistence of Occupational Injuries, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 119 (1994); see also Elinor P.
Schroeder & Sidney A. Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets,
Regulation and Information, 72 GEo. L.J. 1231 (1984).
221. REVIEW, CAN 98-1, supra note 13, at 5, 35-37, 40.
262 [Vol. 32:2
2001] MEXICAN SAFETY AND HEALTH REFORM 263
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent reforms in Mexico's laws raise a reasonable hope of
producing gains in both rule of law and workplace safety.
Improvements may emerge from use of private verification firms
to enhance compliance; from institutionalized notice-and-
comment rulemaking and cost-benefit scrutiny; from enhanced
penalties; from fortified due process rights for employers; and
from intensified experience rating on workers' compensation
premiums. Though positive results may emerge from these
reforms, neutral or even negative consequences could emerge as
well.
Several prominent pre-reform features-namely, joint
committees; alternative prevention and voluntary compliance;
CAB penalty-enhancement powers; and an apparently limited
role for tort law-appear to be carried over into the current
reformed system. All these features pose both potential
disadvantages and potential advantages.
Reservations and concerns arise over several aspects of
Mexico's post reform system: weakness in whistleblower
protection; avoidance of first-infraction penalties; understaffing
on inspection; workers' compensation ineligibility based on
claimant misconduct; special protections focused on pregnant and
lactating women in order to ensure the health of fetuses and
newborns that may thwart equal employment opportunity for
women; lack of an explicit legal right to refuse dangerous work;
possible inadequacies in the workers' compensation system
regarding long-term occupational illnesses; and possible
weaknesses in dealing with problems, particularly in labeling,
information-sharing, and personal protective equipment, raised
by hazardous substances. Future reform initiatives in Mexico
should address these reservations and concerns.

